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We live in an age of reconceptualization of administrative law in which
scholars are proposing new paradigms such as "reflexive" regulation,' "cooper-
ative implementation,"2 and "interactive compliance."3 In the Clinton adminis-
tration, this has meant an emphasis on "reinventing government"4 by making
the administrative process more efficient. At the same time, many in the Repub-
lican-controlled Congress have sought to shift from an adversary or enforcement
paradigm for regulation to a cooperative partnership with the regulated commu-
nity.5 This "new" learning is motivated by the premise that cooperation be-
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thank Professors Alice Kaswan, Lucia Silecchia and George Smith for provocative criticism of this essay and
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the memory of Walter Gellhorn.
1. Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227 (1995). Reflexive regulation in,
for example, the environmental law context means "engender[ing] a practice of environmentally responsible
management" where businesses impose upon themselves policies which "minimize environmental harms and
maximize environmental benefits." Id. at 1232.
2. Douglas C. Michael, Cooperative Implementation of Federal Regulations, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 535,
540-41 (1996). Douglas Michael's expansive notion of "cooperative implementation" includes:
governmental reliance upon agents or employees of the regulated entities themselves to interpret and
enforce applicable rules.... The government would rely on the regulated entities to develop specific
and individual implementation plans, and would thus restrict its role to assisting in and providing
incentives for self-implementation programs, and to maintaining a credible residual program of detec-
tion, surveillance and enforcement.
Id. at 540-41.
3. JAY A. SIGLER & JOSEPH E. MURPHY, INTERACTIVE CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: AN ALTERNATIVE TO
REGULATORY COMPULSION (1988). "Interactive compliance rests upon the encouragement [and development]
of reliable self-regulatory systems for corporate activity." Id. at x; see generally, CORPORATE LAWBREAKING
AND INTERACTIVE COMPLIANCE: RESOLVING THE REGULATION-DEREGULATION DICHOTOMY (Jay A. Sigler &
Joseph E. Murphy eds., 1991).
4. VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW: CREATING A GOV-
ERNMENT THAT WORKS BETER & COSTS LESS 1 (1993).
5. As example, some commentators have suggested that OSHA is based on a system of "compliance
through punishment." See Albert L. Nichols & Richard Zeckhauser, Government Comes to the Workplace: An
Assessment of OSHA, PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1977, at 39, 42. In contrast, the proposed OSHA Consultation
Services Authorization Act of 1995, H.R. 1433, 104th Cong. (1995), would have required OSHA to have
instituted a program of cooperative agreements where employers subject to OSHA could consult with State
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tween business and government is more likely to lead to greater compliance by
the regulated community than the traditional adversarial relationship between
the two.6 Thus, many in Congress and government have stressed the need to
promote flexibility in regulatory enforcement and policy making. This desire for
flexibility has resulted in federal programs such as OSHA's Voluntary Protec-
tion Program, the EPA's Project XL, and the EPA's Environmental Leadership
Program. It has also meant the promotion of performance standards' and mar-
ket based regulations such as deposit/refund systems, tradeable pollution permits
and pollution taxes,8 as well as the proposed elimination of numerous tradi-
tional command and control regulations.9
officials with respect to voluntary efforts by employers to establish and maintain safe and healthful employ-
ment environments and facilities. The possible extent of this focus on cooperation can be seen in the Safety
and Health Improvement and Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 1834, 104th Cong. (1995). Introduced by
Representative Ballenger, this measure would have required OSHA to spend at least half of its budget on
consulting and other employer assistance programs. Id. §§ 4, 5. The Occupational Safety and Health Reform
Reinvention Act, S. 1423, 104th Cong. (1995), included a worksite-based initiatives provision that would have
encouraged voluntary compliance by exempting a facility from all safety and health inspections and investiga-
tions where the facility had an exemplary safety and health record and had a program for identifying and
correcting workplace hazards. Id. § 4. Such provisions would have codified OSHA's Voluntary Protection
Program, discussed at infra part II.A.I.
Legislation which focuses on cooperative partnerships should be seen as distinct from OSHA overhaul
bills. H.R. 107, 104th Cong. (1995), sought to repeal OSHA provisions for inspections, investigations and
recordkeeping, citations, enforcement procedures, judicial review, and civil and criminal penalties. In contrast,
for a proposal that OSHA needs to be strengthened by giving the agency more power, including additional en-
forcement power, see SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, WORKERS AT RISK: THE FAILED PROM-
ISE OF OSHA (1993); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives
and Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1989). Professor Shapiro argues that the political weakness of
workers has prevented the revamping of the Occupational Safety and Health Act to achieve greater workplace
safety. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Occupational Safety and Health: Policy Options and Political Reality, 31
Hous. L. REV. 13, 33-42 (1994). Similarly, Professors McGarity and Shapiro recently argued that most exist-
ing data understate actual workplace fatalities and injuries. See Thomas 0. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro,
OSHA's Critics and Regulatory Reform, 31 WAKE FOREST L, REV. 587, 591-92 (1996).
6. Thomas McGarity classifies this approach as reflecting that of "good government reinventionists."
Thomas 0. McGarity, The Expanded Debate Over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
1463, 1506-13 (1996).
7. See Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 247, 267-68 (1996) (noting that under a performance standard regime, industry is given the freedom to
choose the most flexible and cost-effective means to achieve the regulatory goal). One article has called this a
"beyond incentives approach." Timothy A. Wilkins & Terrell E. Hunt, Agency Discretion and Advances in
Regulatory Theory: Flexible Agency Approaches Toward the Regulated Community as a Model for the Con-
gress-Agency Relationship, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 479, 492 (1995).
8. See UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE UNITED STATES EXPERIMENT
WITH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO CONTROL ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION (1992). See also Richard B. Stewart,
United States Environmental Regulation: A Failing Paradigm, 15 J.L. & COM. 585, 590-91 (1996). Professor
Stewart argues that such market based regulations will provide industry with "positive incentives to invest in
environmental protection, in contrast to the current system, which leads firms to invest in lawyers in order to
fight regulations." Id. at 592.
9. Command and control regulations specify the particular manner in which a regulatory goal must be
met. Examples of command and control regulations include air and water pollution statutes that mandate
specific pollution "fixes," including "best available technology requirements." In contrast, performance stan-
dards only identify the regulatory goal, leaving the method of achieving the goal to the regulated entity. See,
e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (codified as amended at
33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(1)(a) (1994)); Clean Air Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 323 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, 7411 (a)(l)-7412(d)(2) (1994)). As numerous commentators have underscored,
"the use of 'command and control' ideology becomes a political strategy to perpetuate older technologies in
place of using the best performers as models for improvement." See Samuel P. Hays, The Future of Environ-
mental Regulation, 15 J.L. & CoM. 549, 565 (1996).
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For many, an emphasis on voluntary compliance" and other "coopera-
tive" approaches ineluctably means less enforcement. This need not and should
not be the case. A cooperative approach should not be premised on the proposi-
tion that a regulated entity gets "two bites at the apple" before enforcement
kicks in. As example, environmental audits" present a good opportunity for
voluntary compliance, but it is unclear that companies should be given an abso-
lute privilege for any material contained in such audits. The mere fact that a
firm voluntarily undertook an audit which turned up violations should not pre-
clude enforcement on the basis of that audit in every case." The EPA, howev-
er, remains firmly opposed to establishing an absolute evidentiary privilege for
such voluntary orders. 3 This is a far more nuanced regulatory approach than
some of the extreme formulations that promise "absolution" if the firm simply
conducts an audit and takes an accounting of its sins. 4
See also PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE 10-11 (1996). Howard argues that com-
mand-and-control regulation has resulted in the death of common sense: "Our regulatory system has become
an instructional manual. It tells us and bureaucrats exactly what to do and how to do it. Detailed rule after
detailed rule addresses every eventuality, or at least every situation lawmakers and bureaucrats can think of."
Id. See also Stewart, supra note 8, at 585 (noting that "[tihe current paradigm of environmental regulations in
the United States assumes that economic factors (including producers and consumers) in a capitalist market-
based economy will not take measures to reduce pollution, wastes, and other forms of environmental degrada-
tion unless coerced by government to do so"). Compare Daniel J. Fiorino, Toward a New System of Environ-
mental Regulation: The Case for an Industry Sector Approach, 26 ENVTL. L. 457, 465 (1996) (arguing that
"most companies that are regulated for health and safety reasons in this country want to comply with the
law").
10. It should be clear that the term "voluntary compliance," while
probably too well established to be expunged from lawyers' vocabularies[,] is ambiguous and poten-
tially misleading. The word voluntary implies that the motivations for compliance are internal. In
fact, a private actor will often comply with legal norms in whole or in part because of the system of
incentives created by the law. In this situation, compliance is "voluntary" only in the sense that no
one has to invoke the formal machinery of law enforcement to achieve its purposes.
E. Donald Elliot, Environmental TQM: Anatomy of a Pollution Control Program that Works!, 92 MICH. L.
REv. 1840, 1840 n.2 (1994).
11. The EPA defines an environmental audit as "a systematic, documented, periodic and objective re-
view by regulated entities of facility operations and practices related to meeting environmental requirements."
United States Environmental Protection Agency, Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correc-
tion and Prevention of Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,710 (1995) [hereinafter Incentives for Self-Polic-
ing].
12. See id. at 66,706-07. EPA currently provides three incentives for companies to police themselves.
First, the EPA does not seek gravity-based penalties (that is, penalties which reflect the seriousness of the
violation) for violations discovered as a result of a company's own auditing process, and which are promptly
disclosed and corrected. See id. at 66,707. Second, the EPA will reduce by 75% a gravity-based penalty
which, though not discovered though an auditing process, was voluntarily discovered, promptly disclosed, and
expeditiously corrected. See id. Third, the EPA does not make recommendations for criminal prosecution
violations which are discovered through an auditing process and disclosed before a government investigation
begins. See id. Thus, under present EPA policy, companies have "two rather stark alternatives: they can wait
for the EPA to discover any violations and face imposition of the full range of civil and criminal penalties, or
they can conduct audits and comply with the conditions outlined in the policy." David Sorenson, Comment,
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Recent Environmental Auditing Policy and Potential Conflict
with State-Created Environmental Audit Privilege Laws, 9 TUL. ENvrTL. LJ. 483, 489 (1996). The present
incentives present a substantial enhancement of the first audit policy, which merely provided that the "EPA
will not promise to forgo inspections, reduce enforcement responses, or offer other such incentives in ex-
change for implementation of environmental auditing or other sound environmental management practices."
United States Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg.
25,004, 25,007 (1986). See generally Michael Ray Harris, Promoting Corporate Self-Compliance: An Exami-
nation of the Debate Over Legal Protection for Environmental Audits, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 663 (1996).
13. See Incentives for Self Policing, supra note 10, at 66,710.
14. See the proposed Voluntary Environmental Audit Protection Act, S. 582, 104th Cong. (1995). As a
3
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All of these cooperative efforts presume the expansion of agency discretion
within specific goals and parameters. Little attention has been paid, however, to
developing a theory of regulatory flexibility. There has also been a lack of
significant analysis concerning how such flexibility fits into the present Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (APA)."5 This essay attempts to examine some
evolving notions of regulatory flexibility and show how, if at all, they fit in
with the existing framework of the administrative state. It is a preliminary effort
to suggest the kinds of flexibility that should be encouraged and discouraged. It
will highlight as well, the effect of increased administrative flexibility on the
structure of administrative law and the APA thereby raising the question wheth-
er the APA - a document written to structure both adjudication and rule-
making - is, in fact, well suited to regulate cooperation between industry and
government. 6
response to increased environmental liability over the past decade at least 17 states (Arkansas, Colorado,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming) have enacted legislation which provides that
environmental audit reports may not be introduced as evidence in court. See Environmental Audits: State
Immunity, Privilege Laws Examined for Conflicts Affecting Delegated Programs, STATE ENV'T DAILY (BNA),
Sept. 20, 1996. One more, South Dakota, has enacted legislation providing that the state may not request
environmental audit reports from companies. See id.
The oft-repeated argument of the regulated community is that without a comprehensive statutory privi-
lege, companies will scale back their voluntary, self-policing efforts and thus the result will be less, not more,
compliance. See, as example, Protection of Environmental Self-Evaluation Data, Hearing on H.R. 1047 Before
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., FDCH Cong. Testimony, June 29, 1995, (testimony of
Bruce Adler, Senior Environmental Health and Safety Counsel, General Electric Corp.), available in LEXIS,
LEGIS Library, CNGTST File. For large corporations, at least, this argument is little more than an advocate's
assertion and should be taken as such.
15. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 5 U.S.C.).
16. The one exception being negotiated rulemaking, a relatively new approach to agency rulemaking that
facilitates the consensual development of rulemaking by allowing all interested parties to collaborate in the
development of a proposed rule. This bargaining, of course, takes place in the shadow of the agency's ability
to go it alone with informal (section 553) rulemaking, as appropriate. See Administrative Dispute Resolution
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-320, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 3870 (to be codified in 5 U.S.C.), which is
largely based on the now repealed Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969.
And even negotiated rulemaking has played to mixed reviews since it was first approved as an alternative to
conventional agency rulemaking. See William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation
and the Public Interest-EPA's Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55, 89-94 (1987). See also USA Group
Loan Services, Inc. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708, 714-15 (7th Cir. 1996) (neither promises made by officials during
negotiated rulemaking nor claims for bad faith negotiations are enforceable under Negotiated Rulemaking
Act).
4




A number of different types of flexible and cooperative regulatory schemes
have been created in the last few years. These schemes have included induce-
ments or "carrots" for super-compliance, waivers of regulatory requirements if
specific goals are otherwise met, and the use of flexible individuated goals that
depend on the economic and cultural "situation" of a regulated party.
A. Inducements for Super-Compliance
1. OSHA's Voluntary Protection Program
The classic example of inducements for super-compliance is the Voluntary
Protection Program8 ("VPP") created by OSHA 9 in 1982. The VPP offers a
17. Much of the material in this section draws on the excellent study of Professor Lucia Ann Silecchia.
See Lucia Ann Silecchia, Ounces of Prevention and Pounds of Cure: Developing Sound Policies for Environ-
mental Compliance Programs, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 583 (1996). Silecchia is concerned that the removal
of permit and paperwork obligations inherent in a shift from command and control regulations to more coop-
erative modes will in some way allow industry to escape burdensome transaction costs and thus be insulated
from the threat of penalties without actually providing better environmental compliance. Id. at 587-94. See
also Fiorino, supra note 9, at 464. Put otherwise, Silecchia fears that it is merely legal compliance that is
being encouraged, not better environmental results. See Silecchia, supra, at 596-97. To an extent I agree. The
point of performance as opposed to command and control regulations is that they should result in at least
equal compliance with fewer transaction costs. But Silecchia suggests something more. Her complaint is that
"policies creating incentives for environmental compliance must center on the goal of preventing environmen-
tal harm from occurring rather than focussing solely on encouraging legal compliance." Id. at 596. Silecchia
thinks it overly generous to reward entities for "mere compliance" with the law. Id. at 629. Her desire to raise
the bar on environmental compliance or even to devalue process-oriented compliance may or may not be
appropriate. However, it is somewhat unfair for Silecchia to suggest that the cooperative modes should require
a regulated entity to have, what the Department of Justice has described as, "safeguards beyond those required
by law." Id. at 605 (quoting DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FACTORS IN DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL PROSECUTION FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATORS IN THE CONTEXT OF SIGNIFICANT VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE OR DISCLOSURE
EFFORTS BY THE VIOLATOR (July 1, 1991)).
This viewpoint further ignores the fact that the government will not necessarily be rewarding mere
compliance but rather the type of compliance that lowers the government's transaction costs. The mechanisms
critiqued by Silecchia save the government significant costs of enforcement including litigation costs. These
savings do not seem to have been factored into her equation.
18. Although the VPP has no explicit statutory mandate, OSHA is generally authorized to "encourag[e]
employers and employees ... to reduce the number of occupational safety and health hazards at their places
of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(1) (1994). There are no VPP regulations, although guidelines were pub-
lished in the Federal Register in 1988. See Voluntary Protection Programs to Supplement Enforcement and to
Provide Safe and Healthful Working Conditions; Notice of Changes, 53 Fed. Reg. 26,339 (1988) [hereinafter
1988 VPP Notice].
19. OSHA enforces the Occupational Safety Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994), by pro-
mulgating and enforcing standards pursuant to the Act. OSHA's enforcement model is based upon a deter-
rence through punishment scheme consisting of unannounced visits to places of employment by a compliance
officer ("CO") trained in the field of occupational safety and health. If the CO discovers a violation of an
OSHA standard, a citation is issued. If the employer agrees with the CO, they devise an abatement schedule
and fines may be imposed. If the employer disagrees with the nature of the citation, the abatement schedule,
the fine itself, or its amount, it can file a Notice of Contest. A typically "post-modern" course of due process
follows, which includes administrative proceedings and both administrative and judicial appeal. OSHA has
been controversial from its birth, because of its vast regulatory regime (OSHA currently regulates six million
work sites and ninety-six million workers), the dramatic effect of its regulations on a great many businesses,
the fourth amendment issues surrounding its enforcement, and its inevitable embroilment in un-
ion/management relations. However, the effectiveness of its command and control enforcement method is
limited by the low ratio of COs to workplaces. At this time, OSHA has 1,000 COs to inspect six million
5
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special regulatory relationship with the agency, including greater self-policing
authority for companies that demonstrate exemplary employee protection over
time.2"
There are three levels of VPP participation. The three levels are "star"
status, "merit" status, and "VPP" status. Each descending participation level has
less stringent requirements.2 To qualify for the highest participation level, star
status, 22 a company must meet strict criteria over time. Star status firms must
encourage employee participation in addressing workplace health and safety
issues, establish and review annually a written workplace health and safety
program approved by OSHA, offer training in occupational health and safety is-
sues to managers and employees, maintain a reliable feedback system to notify
management of hazards, and utilize follow-up mechanisms to track
management's response to those hazards.' In addition, these companies must
maintain below-average injury rates for their industry for three years before
achieving star status.24 Upon being selected to participate in the star program,
a company assumes primary responsibility for compliance monitoring at its
facility. Although most major OSHA sites are subject to annual compliance
inspections, star facilities are instead subject only to an in-depth star recertifica-
tion inspection every three years, and thus receive a reprieve from possible
surprise inspections.' Minor routine violations reported to OSHA or discov-
ered during the recertification inspections are resolved by requiring that the
hazard be promptly remedied or, in more serious cases, by revoking the
company's star status.26 Only cases involving knowing misconduct or serious
injury at a star facility are referred to OSHA's enforcement staff.27
workplaces with the number of inspections declining forty percent in the past six years. See OSHA Program
at "Critical Juncture" Dear Tells Business, Government Officials, O.S.H. DAILY (BNA), July 21, 1994, at
D2.
20. See Voluntary Protection Programs to Supplement Enforcement and to Provide Safe and Healthful
Working Conditions; Notice of Changes, 50 Fed. Reg. 43,804 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 VPP Notice]; Volun-
tary Protection Programs to Supplement Enforcement and to Provide Safe and Healthful Working Conditions,
47 Fed. Reg. 29,025, 29,027-28 (1982).
21. See Voluntary Protection Programs to Supplement Enforcement and to Provide Safe and Healthful
Working Conditions; Notice of Changes, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,669-70 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 VPP Notice].
22. At this time, about 215 of the six million worksites subject to OSHA are designated star worksites.
Kerr-McGee Facility Earns OSHA Star Status, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 18, 1996, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Wires File. Achieving star status by earning the initial three-year certification is considered an honor
in the industrial community. Companies display that status with the flags and plaques they are awarded, and
indicate their star status on company letterhead. Two Midas Plants in Wisconsin Receive Star Designation by
OSHA, Bus. WIRE, Mar. 20, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
23. See 1986 VPP Notice, supra note 21, at 33,672-74.
24. For example, last year, Motorola's Schaumburg, Illinois facility was the 150th workplace to be
awarded OSHA's prestigious Star award. See Motorola's Schaumburg Facility Awarded OSHA's Highest
Honor, BUS. WIRE, Sept. 26, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. In 1994, the facility had a
forty percent decrease in accidents and, by the end of 1995, a six-five percent decrease is projected. See id.
25. See 1985 VPP Notice, supra note 20, at 43,816. However, all employee complaints, chemical leaks
or spills, as well as all fatalities or catastrophes are handled in accordance with normal OSHA enforcement
procedures. See 1988 VPP Notice, supra note 18, at 26,339.
26. See 1988 VPP Notice, supra note 18, at 26,348. See also Gerry Catanzaro & Judith Weinberg, An.
swers to Some Frequently Asked Questions on VPP, JOB SAFETY & HEALTH Q., Summer 1994, at 22.
27. See 1988 VPP Notice, supra note 18, at 26,339-41.
[Vol. 32:325
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The VPP approach differs sharply from traditional regulatory approaches
rooted in a deep and universal mistrust of the regulated community. With VPP,
OSHA recognized that at least some members of the regulated community have
demonstrated their trustworthiness. Given OSHA's regulatory objectives, com-
panies that have implemented internal self-governing systems that exceed
OSHA standards do not require the same level of scrutiny as companies which
lack such systems or which frequently run afoul of workplace safety laws.
2. EPA's Environmental Leadership Program
The EPA has instituted an Environmental Leadership Program ("ELP"),
similar to OSHA's VPP. Under the ELP pilot program,28 participating compa-
nies agree to meet enhanced pollution prevention goals within the existing regu-
latory framework. They will have to develop an environmental management
system that meets EPA standards as well as compliance management systems
that include the use of devices such as third party audits and self certification.
In exchange, the EPA and participating states will not conduct routine inspec-
tions at ELP facilities, will give participants 90 days to correct violations before
filing an enforcement action, and will provide expedited permitting and permit
modification processes. They will also receive public recognition as a model
facility.29 The ELP is designed to not only clean up pollution, but to develop
strategies which will prevent pollution." The pilot project ended in August,
1996,' and the EPA is developing standards for implementing a nationwide
program by late 1997.32
B. Some Flexibility Alternatives
1. EPA's Excellence and Leadership Program
One approach to regulatory flexibility is the use of waiver or variance from
otherwise applicable general rules. The waiver option can also be viewed as a
recognition that formal rules are unlikely to capture the infinite varieties of
empirical reality and that increased flexibility in the rulemaking process is nec-
essary. Sometimes, these approaches are embedded in a statute,33 in an agency
28. See Voluntary Environmental Self-Policing and Self-Disclosure Interim Policy Statement, 60 Fed.
Reg. 16,875 (1995). The ELP was initiated in April 1995 when twelve model facility program projects were
approved by the EPA. See id. at 16,876. See also Environmental Leadership Program, Notice of Intention to
Develop an Environmental Leadership Program and Request for Comments, 58 Fed. Reg. 4802 (1993).
29. Companies Might See Fewer Inspections, Faster Permitting Under EPA Initiative, 26 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 30, at 1289 (Dec. 1, 1995). The EPA saw this program "as a way to focus its increasingly scarce
enforcement resources where they are needed most" because companies which meet environmental standards
would be exempt from routine inspections. Id. See also Environmental Leadership Program: Request for Pilot
Project Proposals, 59 Fed. Reg. 32,062 (1994); Innovative Initiative to Provide Facilities Relief Readied for
Launch in 1997, Program Chief Says, 27 ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 24, at 1347 (Oct. 18, 1996).
30. See Inspections at Plants to Be Suspended in Environmental Leadership Pilot Program, 25 Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 2448 (Apr. 14, 1995).
31. See UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP PRO-
GRAM FACT SHEET, PUBLICATION NO. 100-F-96-038 (Sept. 1996).
32. See id.
33. As example, the OSHA Act's provisions dealing with variances are §§ 6(b) and 16 (codified at 29
1996]
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regulation, or an agency policy. An example of one such highly touted agency
policy is the EPA's Excellence and Leadership Program ("Project XL") which
centers on the environmental permitting process, rather than on compliance
plans. The philosophy behind Project XL is that since "companies know their
business a whole lot better than the government does, they understand how
better to reduce their own pollution." '34 This program allows certain regulated
industries to design and implement their own strategies to replace EPA regula-
tory requirements when those strategies produce greater environmental bene-
fits. 35
In order to qualify for Project XL approval, a company must propose alter-
natives that:
(a) produce environmental performance superior to that which would be
achieved under current regulations; (b) be "transparent" and accountable,
so that citizens and regulators can examine assumptions and track prog-
ress; (c) not create worker safety problems or not result in environmental
injustice; (d) enjoy the support of the surrounding community; and (e) be
binding and enforceable. 6
Once the initial proposal is approved by the EPA, the applicant is then invited
to develop a "final project agreement" in conjunction with the EPA, state and
local authorities, and other stakeholders (including community organizations,
environmental groups, and worker organizations).37 This "final project, agree-
ment" includes, among other topics, (1) steps the company plans to take to
improve its environmental performance; (2) any exceptions regulators agree to
provide; (3) the basis for measuring performance; (4) the role of the communi-
ty; and (5) a delineation of the expected benefits. 38 The company is allowed to
implement its program after approval by federal and state regulators, communi-
ty organizations, and other stakeholders.39
The success of the XL program is not yet clear. By January, 1997, only
three XL programs had been approved.' C. Boyden Gray, former White
House Counsel, suggested that Project XL has had "virtually no impact" and
that a "chasm ... exists between the Administration's actions and rhetoric
when it comes to environmental innovation."'4' There is significant concern
U.S.C. §§ 655(b)(6), 655(d)). See also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1905 (1996) (OSHA variance regulations). The OSHA
variance policy has proved cumbersome in practice however attractive in theory.
34. Remarks by President Clinton Launching Project XL, FED. NEws SERV., Nov. 3, 1995, available in
1995 WL 8793678.
35. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282, 27,282-83 (1995); ASPEN IN-
STI-IJTE, THE ALTERNATIVE PATH: A CLEANER, CHEAPER WAY TO PROTECT AND ENHANCE THE ENVIRON-
MET 11 (1996) (noting that the EPA's project XL is "a voluntary demonstration of the Alternate Path con-
cept" developed by the Institute).
36. William H. Freedman & Karen A. Caffee, EPA's Project XL: Regulatory Flexibility, NAT. RESOURC-
ES & ENV'T, Spring 1996, at 59, 60.
37. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, supra note 35, at 27,282-87 (1995); see also
Fiorino, supra note 9, at 472 (noting that the final project agreement is a legally enforceable contract).
38. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, supra note 35, at 27,282-87.
39. See id.
40. See Cindy Skrzycki, Critics See a Playground for Polluters in EPA's XL Plan, WASH. POST, Jan. 24,
1997, at DI.
41. Prepared Statement of C. Boyden Gray Before the Senate Government Affairs Committee, Subcom-
[Vol. 32:325
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that agency bureaucracies, still oriented to an adversary model, are resisting
cooperative approaches. Perhaps for this reason the 3M Company withdrew
from the Project XL process on September 5, 1996, when it could not guarantee
that the facility seeking participation would achieve superior environmental
performance. 2
Project XL is an attempt to replace means-oriented requirements with
results-oriented rewards. It is therefore a significant step towards implementing
performance regulation in that it offers the company flexibility in determining
how it can best meet required environmental benchmarks. As President Clinton
has stated, "Here is the bar. If you can figure out how to jump over it... the
old way, the new way, a different way, forward or backward - all you have to
do is jump over the bar."'43
2. The EPA Superfund Brownfields Program
Waiver approaches and cooperative agreements like Project XL allow
regulated entities, while still meeting applicable performance goals, to seek
specific exceptions to regulations under specified conditions. In contrast, flexi-
ble alternatives, such as those used by the EPA's "Brownfields Economic Rede-
velopment Initiative,"'  promote significantly greater regulatory flexibility in
mittee on Financial Management and Accountability, FED. NEws SERV., Sept. 25, 1996.
42. Because it was using an experimental technology, the company could not make that guarantee. See
3M Decides to Drop Out of Project XL Process After Disagreement Over Performance Guarantees, 27 Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 1045 (Sept. 13, 1996). But see John H. Cushman, Jr., EPA and Arizona Factory Agree
on Innovative Regulatory Plan, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 20, 1996, at A18 (EPA approval of Intel Corporation plan
in Arizona).
43. Marianne Lavelle, Bending the Rules, NAT'L L.J., June 10, 1996, at Al. A similar type of regulatory
reform is being considered in Canada. In 1994, the Canadian Parliament considered and let die legislation that
would have allowed persons subject to regulation to propose alternative compliance plans that still meet the
regulatory goals of the designated regulation. Canada Legislative Index, 35th Parliament, 1st Sess., Bill C-62
(Jan. 2, 1994 to Feb. 2, 1996). The Regulatory Efficiency Act, as it was popularly known, received a "scath-
ing" report from the Parliament's Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations. Dennis Bueckert, Cabinet Gains
More Power in New Bill, Report Warns, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Apr. 22, 1995, at A5. The report found that the
bill was "contrary to fundamental constitutional values" because it gave the executive cabinet "unlimited
discretion to grant individual exemptions from existing and future subordinate laws." Id. The report further
noted that the bill would mainly benefit large corporations because small businesses "would lack the resources
and expertise to negotiate compliance plans." Id. In February 1996, it was uncertain to observers whether a
new version of the bill would be introduced at the next Parliament. Neville Nankivell, Federal Liberals in
"Disequilibrium", FIN. POST, Feb. 6, 1996, at 17. In March 1996, the Regulations Act, which seeks to reform
the regulatory process in general, was introduced and received a second reading. Bill C-25, House of Com-
mons, 35th Parliament, 2nd Sess., (Ist reading Mar. 22, 1996; 2d reading June 18, 1996). For a view that the
procedural safeguards included in the legislation achieved a proper balance between institutional control and
the need for flexibility and discretion in order to regulate in a more efficient manner, see Todd-Jeffrey Weiler,
The Consultation Requirement in Regulatory Reform: Taking a Look at the Proposed Regulatory Efficiency
Act, 8 CAN. J. ADMIN. L. & PRAc. 101 (1994-95).
44. As of October 4, 1996, seventy-six pilot projects had been funded by the EPA under the project. See
Brownfields Grants from $90,000 to $200,000 Awarded to 16 Blighted Urban Industrial Areas, 27 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 22, at 1241 (Oct. 4, 1996). The 104th Congress' support for this program is illustrated by their
$36.8 million appropriation specifically for the Brownfields program. See House, Senate Pass Bill Giving EPA
$6.7 Billion; Clinton Plans to Sign Measure, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 1193 (Sept. 27, 1996). The
1996 Republican platform supported the Brownfields program by supporting expanded state participation in
the program. See 1996 Republican Platform Calls for Limits on "Inflexible" Environmental Requirements, 27
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 890 (Aug. 16, 1996). Senate Republican leaders, however, rejected an EPA pro-
posal that would have "authorize[d] start-up funding for state and local governments and indian tribes to de-
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the Superfund program not only as to means but as to regulatory goals as
well.45 "Brownfields are abandoned, idle, or under-utilized industrial sites, usu-
ally in urban areas."'' Under this program, the EPA funds up to $200,000 for
each two-year pilot project.47 Pilots are selected to test whether regulatory bar-
riers can be removed without sacrificing environmental protection," as well as
to improve coordination between federal, state and local authorities. 9
This flexible regulatory approach is not, however, available for every haz-
ardous site.- Under the program, the government agrees to reduce the liability
of prospective purchasers of contaminated property who engage in voluntary
cleanup programs that satisfy EPA officials. Under existing law, contaminated
soil must often be cleaned to zero pollution. In contrast, under the Brownfields
initiative, the extent of the clean- up is determined by government regulators in
light of a number of characteristics, including the future use to which the prop-
erty would be put." Some states, including Connecticut, Missouri, and Penn-
sylvania,52 have enacted cost recovery programs 3 which supplement the fed-
eral program and support the cleanup efforts of the companies which invest in
Brownfields 4
velop comprehensive brownfield programs." Separate EPA Proposal on Brownfields Rejected by Senate Re-
publican Leaders, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 608 (July 19, 1996). The Republican leaders objected to
separate Brownfields legislation because they thought it would jeopardize their ability to pass a comprehen-
sive superfund bill. See id. See also Marianne Lavelle, Interests in Brownfields Abound Despite Problems,
NAT'L L.J., Oct. 18, 1996, at B 1.
45. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) or
Superfund, Section 104; Announcement of Application Deadline for the Competition for Brownfields Eco-
nomic Redevelopment Initiative Pilots, 60 Fed. Reg. 49,276 (1995) [hereinafter Brownfields Pilots Announce-
ment].
46. See R. Michael Sweeney, Brownfields Restoration and Voluntary Cleanup Legislation, 2 ENVTL. L.
101, 105 (1995).
47. See Brownfields Pilots Announcement, supra note 45, at 49,276.
48. Id.
49. See id. In January, 1995, the EPA announced the inclusion of the original program within a greater
Brownfields Action Agenda. EPA, The Brownfields Action Agenda (last modified Jan. 25, 1995)
<http://www.epa.gov/swerospa/bf/aa.htm>. In addition to continued support for the original pilot program, the
goals of the Agenda include clarifying "the liability of prospective purchasers, lenders, property owners, and
others regarding their association with and activities at a [Brownfield] site," partnership and cooperation with
state and local authorities as well as the communities involved, and job development and training. Id.
50. See Sweeney, supra note 46, at 157. Sweeney notes that "Brownfields restoration and redevelopment
is not founded upon the concept that the 'polluter pays.' Contrary to traditional hazardous waste remediation
programs, voluntary cleanup programs provide private parties with incentives for underwriting the remediation
of land they did not pollute." Id.
51. See id. at 160.
52. According to a survey conducted by Environmental Information, Ltd., "the most complete, sophis-
ticated and effective brownfields redevelopment programs can be found in the Northeast and the Midwest."
ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION, LTD., BROWNFIELDS: STATE PROGRAMS AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES vi
(1996).
53. "Cost recovery in this context is a mechanism by which the agency directly recovers the costs of
overseeing the project from whomever signs a voluntary agreement to clean up the site." Northeast, Midwest








Carried to its logical extension, the "Brownfields" approach ineluctably
leads to the notion of individuated solutions negotiated between administrative
agencies and individual companies to meet the needs of each particular case. As
a theoretical matter, some commentators (perhaps even Howard) would view
this form of "enforced self-regulation"'55 as the most creative and efficient use
of the administrative process. It reflects a form of "responsive regulation"56
where the regulators work creatively with individual corporations (or plant sites)
to achieve an individuated level of compliance. Making regulatory agreements
more "individualized," however, makes it less likely that consistency will be
achieved and general standards followed. This model of the "standardless"
administrative state is exactly what an earlier generation of lawyers had in mind
when they inveighed against a vision of administrative law they referred to as
the "new despotism.""
The notion of individually negotiated environmental contracts between an
individual plant or industry sector tracks an approach that is growing popular in
Europe - the environmental covenant.58 The classic example is the Dutch
Basic Metal Industry Covenant, signed in 1992."9 The covenant is a written
agreement between a public body and an individual company or industrial sec-
tor in which the regulated party agrees to undertake agreed upon activities that
reduce environmental degradation. In return, the government or third party
agrees to undertake specific activities or to waive otherwise applicable regulato-
ry procedures.' The danger is that the government will waive statutory re-
quirements in the covenant or make ultra vires undertakings. This happened
apparently in the Netherlands, where signatories to an herbicide convention
were incorrectly told that they need not apply for emission licenses.6' These
individually negotiated agreements are intrinsically suspect in the American
55. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION
DEBATE 101 (1992) ("The enforced self-regulation model... is about negotiation occurring between the state
and individual firms to establish regulations that are particularized to each firm.").
56. Id. at 4-7. This concept has also been referred to as "interactive compliance." See supra note 3 and
accompanying text.
57. LORD HEWART OF BURY, THE NEW DESPOTISM 37 (1929) (asserting that administrative law is sub-
stantially the opposite of the "rule of law").
58. See ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS AND COVENANTS: NEW INSTRUMENTS FOR A REALISTIC ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLICY (Jan M. van Dunn6 ed., 1993) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS AND COVENANTS];
see also MINDY GAMPEL, INDUSTRY STRATEGY DIVISION, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, THE DUTCH MODEL: LESSONS FOR THE U.S. (1995) [hereinafter THE DUTCH MODEL]; Fiorino,
supra note 8, at 486; Ronald van de Krol, Business and the Environment: Partners in Grime: Dutch Industry
Has Been Drawing Up Covenants with the Government, FIN. TIMES, May 1, 1996, at 20.
59. See Jit Peters, Voluntary Agreements Between Government and Industry: The Basic Metal Covenant
As Example, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS AND COVENANTS, supra note 58, at 19-49. Other industries
which have been involved in these contracts and covenants include the chemical, primary metals, packaging,
and metal products. See THE DUTCH MODEL, supra note 58, at 1.
60. See THE DUTCH MODEL, supra note 58, at 1-2.
61. See, as example, the Dutch Covenant Concerning the Reduction of the Emission of Herbicides,
where the government wrongly waived the need for emissions licenses under certain circumstances. See Peter
J.J. van Buuren, Environmental Covenants Possibilities and Impossibilities: An Administrative Lawyer's View,
in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS AND COVENANTS, supra note 58, at 51.
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"rule of law" environment exemplified by the APA. Indeed, as Richard Stewart
points out, "in the United States it would require legislation to give both gov-
ernment environmental authorities and industry the legal flexibility to use con-
tracts and covenants to negotiate agreements that would in some respect be
inconsistent with existing regulatory requirements and deadlines."6
Without standards, one faces the problem of accountability in its starkest
form. The difference between two hypothetical Brownfields settlement agree-
ments may depend as much upon the attitude of the EPA negotiator or the
persuasive ability of industry officials as on the objective characteristics of each
site. The danger, then, is that flexibility could mean "relaxed standards rather
than adapting compliance to circumstances."63 Professor Kenneth Davis, in his
insightful work Discretionary Justice, has pointed out that while the subjectivity
of individual bureaucrats can influence agency practices, discretion can be
cabined through the use of structural procedures.64 One example of this kind of
structural procedure is the extensive list of criteria for eligibility and continuing
participation in VPP or ELP that requires applicants and participants to meet
objective performance standards.
4. Settlement Agreements
Due to the transaction costs and the publicity attendant on modem litiga-
tion, companies often prefer to settle worker safety or environmental complaints
with the government. Companies entering into these settlement agreements
often agree to conditions that the government could not otherwise enforce, even
if won in court, as they go beyond the scope of statutory enforcement authority.
For example, many settlement agreements negotiated between employers and
OSHA contain provisions requiring safety and health audits, even though such
audits are not required by law.65 These settlement negotiations raise significant
issues of standardless decision making and accountability.
62. Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Contracts and Covenants: A United States Perspective, in ENVI-
RONMENTAL CONTRACTS AND COVENANTS, supra note 58, at 148.
63. See Hays, supra note 9, at 567.
64. See KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 97 (1969). Professor
Davis proposes the use of "open plans, open policy statements, open rules, open findings, open reasons, open
precedents, and fair informal procedure" to structure discretionary power. Id. at 98. Professor Davis places a
premium on openness in the use of discretionary power because openness helps prevent arbitrariness, See id.
See also KENNETH C. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION iii-viii (1975).
65. A good example of these types of agreements are the numerous corporate-wide settlement agree-
ments with the major auto manufacturers dealing with ergonomics issues which provide for safety audits as
well as ergonomic studies for each plant. See GM, UAW Reach Settlement With OSHA on Cumulative Trauma
Hazards Cited By Agency, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Nov. 23, 1990, at A7. See also Ford to Pay $1.2 Million
Fine, Expand Existing Ergonomics Program Under Settlement, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July 24, 1990, at
AIS.
Often a violation in one facility leads to a settlement by which the company is required to conduct
comprehensive audits at all its locations. See, e.g., Paper Company Agrees to Pay $872,220 Fine, Conduct
Corporate-Wide Plant Safety Audit, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Aug. 1, 1988, at Al I (requiring the company to
audit each of its facilities and implement a plan to abate hazards found in the audits); Simpson Paper Agrees
to OSHA Settlement, Will Pay $300,000, Create Safety Position, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July 11, 1990, at
All (where the company was required in the settlement agreement, to create a safety manager position re-
sponsible for auditing each of the company's thirty facilities).
[Vol. 32:325
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One extensively articulated effort to approximate individuated regulation in
settlement agreements is the Supplemental Enforcement Program (SEP) of the
EPA, in existence since 1991.' The SEP is a program in which environmental
violators receive reduced penalties in exchange for undertaking environmental
cleanup programs not otherwise part of the EPA's statutory armamentarium. In
a sense, a corporation could receive some form of "credit" for undertaking envi-
ronmentally beneficial activities.'
Recognizing that some structuring of agency discretion in the enforcement
context is needed, the EPA developed a set of standards which generally require
that mitigation or credit programs must "closely address the environmental
effects of the violators.""8 This means that a credit may be given for a program
that corrects the damage done by a polluter as, for example where a pollutant
was allowed into a stream or river and there was substantial fishkill "and the
polluter agreed to restock those fish."69
The Reagan Justice Department, however, determined that these standards
were too porous and sought to more clearly defie the kinds of situations where
settlement money (however defined) need not go to the federal treasury and
could be used for pro-environmental purposes.70 Part of the Justice
Department's concern was based on legal grounds. The Miscellaneous Receipts
Act7' makes clear that government agencies cannot finance their own enforce-
ment activity absent special statutory authority. Nor can agencies use such mon-
ey to reinforce a bureaucrat's conception of the public good. The Supreme
Court is clear that all funds paid to an agency in the form of civil penalties
must go to the Treasury.72 To do otherwise would violate anti-augmentation
principles73 which limit federal agencies to the money appropriated by Con-
gress for their work.74 The question then becomes whether payments to private
66. See James J. Periconi & David Nelson, The Precedent-Setting Use of a Pollution Prevention Project
in an EPA Enforcement Settlement: The First Dollar-for-Dollar Penalty Offset, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 48,
at 2049 (April 1, 1994).
67. EPA, Policy on the Use of Supplemental Enforcement Projects in EPA Settlements, 25 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 35,607 (1991). This policy was revised in 1995 "to provide greater flexibility to EPA in
exercising its enforcement discretion." Interim Revised EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy, 60
Fed. Reg. 24,856 (1995).
68. Periconi & Nelson, supra note 66, at 2049.
69. Environmental Credit Projects Under Clean Water Act: Hearing on H.R. 3411 Before the Subcomm.
on Fisheries and WildlifeConservation and the Environment and Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 104th Cong. 29-30 (1987) (testimony of Raymond Ludwiszewski,
Associate Deputy Attorney General).
70. See David S. Mann, Comment, Polluter-Financed Environmentally Beneficial Expenditures: Effective
Use or Improper Abuse of Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water Act?, 21 ENVTL. L. 175, 178 (1991).
71. 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) (1994). This matter is discussed in Effect of 31 U.S.C. § 484 on the Settlement
Authority of the Attorney General, 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 684 (1980).
72. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 53 (1987); Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 14 (1981).
73. See 2 OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRINCIPLES OF FED-
ERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAv § E-1, at 6-103 (2d ed. 1992).
74. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that Congress retains control of the public purse by
disallowing agency augmentation of appropriations through agency created settlement programs. See James F.
Hinchman, Comptroller General, Statement to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 1993 WL
798227 (Mar. 1, 1993); see also 1992 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 1319 (July 7, 1992) (EPA lacks authority to
settle enforcement actions by entering into settlement agreements that allow alleged violators to fund public
1996]
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parties as part of a consensual settlement or consent judgment in a citizens'
enforcement suit are civil penalties.75
A larger part of its concern is jurisprudential - both constitutional and
otherwise. Traditional doctrines of prosecutorial discretion have given a wide
range of discretionary authority to regulators to "plea bargain" or settle cases.
As suggested above, they can make arrangements that would produce "enforce-
ment" results beyond that which could be required by law. Certainly they could
require an agreement on matters over which the government could choose to
sue but did not (e.g., clean up plant 2 as well if we are to settle the citation for
plant 1) as well as for cases where the government is asking for a form of pen-
ance not specifically within its enforcement authority (e.g., requiring a child
labor violator to make contributions to a college scholarship fund for youthful
employees). But this principle is not without limits. Under its power of the
purse, Congress can constrain regulatory officials to the limits their statutory
warrants. And, there is no inherent executive authority to settle cases on terms
that have no connection with the agency's statutory warrant. Certainly there is
nothing in the Constitution that suggests otherwise.
awareness and other projects in exchange for reductions of civil penalties); Matter of Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's Authority to Mitigate Civil Penalties, 70 Comp. Gen. 17 (Oct. 9, 1990) (NRC lacks authority
to implement options which would allow a violator to, in lieu of civil penalties, to fund research programs).
The rule requiring civil penalties to be paid to the Treasury has been criticized as an inflexible ap-
proach that undermines environmental protection efforts. Avoiding the "civil penalty" label has led critics to
question whether by calling any payment an aspect of "injunctive" relief a settlement can be structured to
avoid classifying a payment as a civil penalty. See Elizabeth R. Thagard, Note, The Rule That Clean Water
Act Penalties Must Go the Treasury and How To Avoid It, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 507 (1992). Courts have
steadfastly upheld the rule. The Third Circuit ordered civil penalties placed in a private trust fund to be paid
to the Treasury. See Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc.,
913 F.2d 64 (3rd Cir. 1990). The Ninth Circuit, however, held that payments derived from an out-of-court
settlement before liability was found were not civil penalties. See Sierra Club, Inc. v. Electronic Controls
Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1990). The Sierra court concluded, however, that once liability was
established, payments must be classified as civil penalties and paid to the Treasury. See id. at 1353. Since the
Sierra decision, courts have classified payments to private parties as civil penalties depending on when liabili-
ty was found and settlement agreements reached. See Michael Paul Stevens, Limits on Supplemental Environ-
mental Projects in Consent Agreements to Settle Clean Water Act Citizen Suits, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 757,
770 77 (1994).
75. A more substantive question remains as to whether payments to private parties that clean up the
work of the polluter are acceptable (generally yes) or whether one can rely on a "nexus" between the viola-
tion and the remedial acL See EPA, CLEAN WATER ACT PENALTY POLICY FOR CIVIL SETrLEMENT NEGOTIA-
TIONs 7 (Feb. 11, 1986). One may wonder, further, whether an agency can require, as a condition of settle-
ment, a company to engage in conduct unconnected at all with the agency's specific statutory mission. As
example, could the Department of Labor condition a child labor settlement on a company's agreement to
provide scholarships to youthful employees. The propriety of this extended form of individuated agreement
remains unclear.
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REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY
I. SOME THEORETICAL ISSUES CONCERNING FLEXIBILITY
IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. Introduction
The central theoretical issue for Administrative Law in the twentieth centu-
ry has been the drive to curtail agency discretion through the use of procedures
that structure adjudications or rulemaking as well as judicial review of such
agency action. The fear of empowering bureaucrats with untrammeled flexibility
reflects a traditional concern that the administrative state, if unchecked, would
act arbitrarily and capriciously.
Administrative law has endeavored historically to check the exercise of
discretionary power by establishing a variety of procedures that restrict the
ambit of government bureaucracies in both the adjudication and rulemaking
process. This concern for the value of procedural formalism creates a tension
between traditional administrative procedures and the regulatory flexibility ap-
proach.76 This section will consider some legal issues intrinsic to the notion of
regulatory flexibility. Some of these tensions are raised in Philip Howard's
recent best-seller, The Death of Common Sense. Howard criticizes regulatory
excess arguing that "[i]f you spend all your effort trying to comply with regula-
tions, you don't have so much time to use common sense." He approves of
Project XL because "[tihat's exactly what regulation should be. It doesn't mean
you trust people. It means you state goals and you allow people enough room
to accomplish those goals instead of just complying with rules."'78
Although a severe critic of the bureaucratic process, 9 Howard does not
propose fewer rules or no rules;"° nor does he propose more detailed rules and
more aggressive judicial review as did the Congressional Republicans between
1994 and 1996.s" Instead, his remedy would empower bureaucrats by giving
76. Proceduralism often leads to a defensive approach to governing which focuses on ensuring that im-
proprieties do not occur in public service. As Professor Jerry Mashaw has shown in his studies of the welfare
state, proceduralism puts a premium on fairness, and also leads to centralized bureaucracy. See JERRY L.
MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 171-72 (1983); JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE STATE 158-60 (1985); Jerry L. Mashaw, "Rights" in the Federal Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J.
1129, 1132 (1983).
77. James R. Petersen, The Death of Common Sense, PLAYBOY, Sept. 1995, at 41 (interview with Philip
K. Howard) [hereinafter Howard Interview].
78. Id.
79. HOWARD, supra note 9, at 3-5. Howard cites numerous examples of apparent foolishness by gov-
ernment bureaucrats. He points to the example of Mother Teresa, whose Missionaries of Charity set aside
$500,000 to renovate an abandoned building for the homeless in New York City. See id. at 4. The Sisters did
not believe that modern conveniences such as the dishwasher, washing machine, and elevator were necessary.
See id. The project stalled when the city dcmanded that the Charity spend $100,000 for an elevator which
they would never use and failed two years later because the dispute over the elevator could not be resolved.
See id. "According to [Mother Teresa's] representative, 'The Sisters felt they could use the money much more
usefully for soup and sandwiches."' Id. In a letter to the city, the Sisters "noted that the episode, 'served to
educated us about the law and its many complexities."' Id.
80. See Howard Interview, supra note 77, at 41. Howard was asked, "Are you against all regulation?"
He responded, "Of course not. Everyone wants safe planes, honest prospectuses and clean air. The big gov-
ernment-no government debate largely misses the point. The problem is how government works" Id.
81. The most forceful expression of the Republican vision can be seen in H.R. 9, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
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them more responsibility (or in administrative law terms, more discretion) to
take matters into their own hands. 2 Howard advocates giving bureaucrats flex-
ibility to decide whether to waive rules, to accept individuated compliance solu-
tions, or to ignore the letter of the law to accomplish its "spirit."83 Commenta-
tors, such as Joshua Stein, argue that Howard's project is about "building a
better bureaucrat," one who can "make decisions, exercise judgment and grant
exceptions when the general rule would produce the wrong result in a specific
case."
84
Critics have charged that contemporary efforts to inject such flexibility into
the administrative process should be viewed as an effort to "delegalize the
system." The problem, John DiIulio suggests, is that while "there are undoubt-
edly conditions under which affording bureaucrats greater discretion makes
sense[,] ... we lack the general knowledge necessary to specify these condi-
tions." 5 Thus, one commentator suggests that "the current push toward
delegalization threatens to undermine the American commitment to the rule of
law.
8 6
B. The Use of Waivers
One approach to the concern about inflexible rules is the recent waiver
provision in the 1996 revisions to the Florida Administrative Procedure Act."
(1995), which died at the end of the 104th Congress without reaching the floor of the Senate. Title II of that
Act would have required major rules to be accompanied by a detailed regulatory impact analysis. See id. at
§ 322. Title IV of the Act would have provided for judicial review for noncompliance with any part of the
entire Act. See id. at § 441. The Act required, inter alia, cost benefit analysis of all major rules, and procedur-
al changes to the APA, including advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, extended comment period, and
hearings for all major rules. See id. at §§ 413, 322.
82. See HOWARD, supra note 9, at 180. In explaining what he means by common sense, Howard stated:
It's not a single truth, some absolute wisdbm, but the responsibility to make sense of any given situa-
tion. Often the "common sense solution" is the result of a dialogue or an argument between, say, the
safety inspector and the foremen, or between the citizen seeking a permit and the bureaucrat behind
the desk. In today's regulatory system, the official has no opportunity to adjust for circumstances.
Regulatory Reform: The Case for Common Sense; An Interview with Philip K. Howard, WASH. MONTHLY,
Sept. 1995, at 23 [hereinafter Regulatory Reform Interview].
83. See Regulatory Reform Interview, supra note 82, at 23.
84. Joshua Stein, Building a Better Bureaucrat, REGULATION, No. 3, 1995, at 24, 28.
85. JOHN J. DIIuLio, JR., WHY BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION IS A PROBLEM: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND
HOPE 10 (Am. Enterprise Inst., Conference Paper, Jan. 17, 1996). In Dilulio's view, the "practical and unes-
capable fact of asymmetric information" between manager and line employees almost invariably allows bu-
reaucrats to "shirk (goof off on the job), subvert (commit acts of administrative malfeasance), or steal (use
public office for private gain) without always getting caught or penalized for it (suspended, demoted, fired,
criminally prosecuted)." Id. at 19. The three possible "organizational strategies for producing principled
agents - bureaucrats who refrain from renegade discretion" are "bureaucratization, professionalization and
culture-building." Id. at 21-22. In DiIulio's view, the only one of these strategies to make a difference is
culture-building in the few cases where there is a "strong" agency culture. See id. at 33-37. And even here the
cultural constraint only works in contexts of promoting more regulatory activity, not less. See id.
86. Keith Werhan, Delegalizing Administrative Law, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 423, 460.
87. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 120.52-.81 (West Supp. 1997). That Act was based on a Report issued by
the Governor's Administrative Procedure Review Commission after Governor Lawton Chiles vetoed the
legislature's 1995 reform efforts which he had himself initially proposed. See FINAL REPORT OF TIlE
GOVERNOR'S ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT REVIEW COMMISSION (1996) (report detailing recommenda-
tions of the 15-member commission created to study how to best revise the Florida Administrative Procedure
Act). In his veto message, Governor Chiles stated that the reform bill was not consistent with the Florida state
constitution, which envisioned "a system in which the Legislature charts the direction our state should take
16
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Florida's revised APA is an attempt to achieve greater regulatory flexibility
through waivers, and greater accountability through limitations on rulemaking
authority. Specifically, the 1996 Florida APA requires agencies to grant waivers
of regulations to applicants who can show that (1) "the purpose of the underly-
ing statute will be or has been achieved by other means by the [applicant]" and
(2) where "application of a rule would create a substantial hardship or would
violate principles of fairness."" By requiring rather than permitting waivers
under certain specified conditions, the result of this new mandatory waiver
provision may well be to diminish rather than expand agency discretion and
flexibility.89 Indeed, "to the extent that Florida's new waiver provision takes
away, rather than increases, agency discretion, it is not a flexibility provision at
all."' It is a mechanistic formula for selective deregulation.9
The Florida "supermandate" mandating hardship waivers92 is a unique
regulatory strategy. Under caselaw interpreting the previous statute, waivers
were limited to situations in which the agency had expressly provided for them
"in published rules, or where agencies met a heightened burden of explana-
tion." '93 It is frankly somewhat difficult to understand why a financial hardship
in itself is grounds to relieve one of the obligations of a duly constituted rule.
In contrast, as example, the OSHA enabling statute does not allow for
individual hardship waivers. While OSHA is obligated to take economic feasi-
bility into account when setting its safety and health standards,94 it need only
consider the economic feasibility of a standard for an entire industry.
All corporations in an industry are required to meet that industry standard.
An individual business cannot jettison worker safety because it finds the cost of
worker safety too onerous. The OSHA view that hardship reflects industry
feasibility,9" not the idiosyncracies of an individual business, reflects the pri-
through broad statements of policy and in which the executive branch makes decisions in individual cases
which best accomplish the goals the Legislature has set." Letter of Governor Lawton Chiles to Secretary of
State Sandra B. Mortham, July 12, 1995, at 2 (on file with the Florida Secretary of State's Office) (vetoing
Senate Bill 536). See also William Booth, Florida Seeks to End Rule by the Book, WASH. POST, Mar. 14,
1995, at 1; Kevin Metz, Florida's "New" Face Same as Old; Proposals to Reshape State Government Fiz-
zles, TAMPA TRIB., May 22, 1995, at 1.
Minnesota has a waiver provision that allows agencies to develop procedures for permissive waivers.
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 465.797 (West Supp. 1997).
88. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.542 (West Supp. 1997). The Act defines "substantial hardship" as "a dem-
onstrated economic, technological, legal, or other type of hardship" and states that "'principles of fairness' are
violated when the literal application of a rule affects a particular person in a manner significantly different
from the way it affects other similarly situated persons who are subject to the rule." Id. § 120.542(2).
89. See Jim Rossi, The 1996 Revised Florida Administrative Procedure Act: A Survey of Major Provi-
sions Affecting Florida Agencies, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 283, 293-94 (1997).
90. Id. at 304.
91. Whether this provision indeed achieves flexibility depends upon its interpretation by Administrative
Law Judges and Courts. This is the view of the expert on the statute, Professor Jim Rossi of Florida State
University. See Jim Rossi, Florida's 1996 Revised APA, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWs, Fall 1996, at 9.
92. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.542(2) (West Supp. 1997).
93. Rossi, supra note 91, at 9.
94. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1994) (empowering OSHA to promulgate the standard "which most ade-
quately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer
material impairment of health or functional capacity"). See also American Textile Mfrs. v. Donovan, 452 U.S.
490, 508 (1981) (holding that feasibility means "capable of being done").
95. While the OSHA statute is interpreted to allow the agency to regulate to the level of industry feasi-
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macy of the social concern for worker safety that is the very core of the OSHA
regulatory scheme.96
The OSHA approach, however, may well be too rigid. There may be occa-
sions where the individual hardship is great and a waiver would not impact ad-
versely on safety, health or other regulatory goals. In such a situation, the possi-
bility of a waiver should not be excluded. Far more sophisticated, therefore, is
an approach the Iowa bar has proposed to the Iowa legislature which allows for
both mandatory waivers when "application of the rule to the petitioner [for a
waiver] on the basis of specified facts in the petition would not serve any of the
purposes of the rule," and for permissive waivers under various narrowly de-
fined circumstances.97 Thus, if application of the rule to the petitioner would
cause undue hardship and waiver of the rule would be consistent with the pub-
lic interest and would not prejudice the substantial rights of another person,
granting of a waiver is discretionary.9" Indeed, the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1995," which calls for the reduction or waiver of
civil penalties under certain circumstances including "ability to pay," leaves
those decisions for the agency to decide "under appropriate circumstances."'"
The notion that agencies should have waiver authority is not new.' So
long as the enabling statute provides for it, regulators have often chosen (usual-
ly by regulation) to waive otherwise applicable command and control regula-
tions. For example, the Mine Safety and Health Act of 197702 allows the Sec-
retary of Labor to modify any mine safety standard if he "determines that an
alternative method of achieving the [same] result ... will ... guarantee no less
than the same measure of protection afforded ... by such standard, or that the
application of such standard ... will result in a diminution of safety to the
miners in such a mine."'0 3 At least 600 petitions for modification were ap-
proved in the first five years of the Act's implementation.'" The Department
of Energy had a similar process during the 1970s."5 In contrast to the
Brownfields program, the DOE exceptions process required a structural admin-
istrative determination, albeit one classified as informal agency action.'1 The
bility, the regulations appear to provide for some enforcement flexibility where a specific company reaches its
individual feasibility level and is still not in compliance. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001(0(1)(ii) (1996)
(OSHA asbestos regulation).
96. See Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
97. See IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REFORM, PROPOSED
NEW IOWA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 17A.4106, at 75-76 (Nov. 21, 1996). The Reporter of this
draft is Professor Arthur Earl Bonfield of the University of Iowa Law School.
98. See id.
99. Pub. L. No. 104-121, §§ 201-253, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 857-74.
100. Id. § 223(a), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 862.
101. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to Administrative Rules,
1982 DUKE L.J. 277, 278 n. 1l (describing a number of statutes and agency rules which give authority and
criteria for waivers in an individual case).
102. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1994).
103. Id. § 811 (c).
104. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 55, at 116.
105. See Peter H. Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and the Formulation
of Energy Policy Through an Exceptions Process, 1984 DUKE Li. 163, 209-12 (discussing the administrative
structure of the exceptions process); see id. at 212-63 (describing four exceptions case studies).
106. See id. at 210-11 (describing the levels of administrative review of exceptions). Professor Schuck
[Vol. 32:325
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exceptions process, in fact, often functioned as a substitute for the rulemaking
process." At the same time, the exceptions process performed a key "'safety
valve function' [by] relieving pressure on over-broad rules in individual
cases."' 5 While few would argue that the DOE process (or other exception
processes) never introduce ad hoc and idiosyncratic considerations into the deci-
sional process, the theory of the DOE waiver was that if a firm met the criteria
it received a waiver, not that the waiver criteria were to be negotiated ad hoc.
One concern about the use of waivers as well as other efforts at regulatory
flexibility is that they may well leave out of the discussion the concerns of
"stakeholders" other than the two federal government and the regulated entity.
This could include public interest groups, state and local governments and con-
cerned private citizens. To this extent, the cooperative impulse may well cut
against the participatory model of administrative law that has become current in
the discipline since the 1960s.
Part of this concern is endemic to administrative law generally - after all,
recent restrictions on standing make intervention of third parties more difficult
even where the cooperative agreement is sufficiently formalized to allow for
judicial review. At the same time, the lack of an institutional structure to sup-
port third party intervention is a not insignificant concern. The extent to which
consent decrees, as example, appropriately preclude third party (read public)
intervenors has long concerned public interest lawyers." This problem mani-
fested itself in criticism by environmental groups over environmental covenants
in Europe in that such groups feared they might lack the ability to fully partici-
pate in the process of formulating the covenant."' To go some way toward
meeting this generalized concern, the EPA announced, in early 1997, that it
would provide $25,000 in grants to interested third parties to undertake inde-
pendent technical assessments of XL proposals and promised more roundtable
meetings with the public to discuss an XL proposal."' Indeed, the EPA has
underscored that the extent to which project proponents have sought and
achieved the support of public interest groups and other stakeholders is an
"important factor" in assessing project proposals."' In another context, the
suggests, however, that this informal structure was not necessarily flawed in practice. See id. at 217-20, 230
(describing the manner in which a particular exception evolved into "a full-fledged subsidy program with
clearly stated, legislative-type criteria" through "a procedure strikingly similar to informal rulemaking under
the APA").
107. See id. at 217-29.
108. Id. at 251. One problem with safety valves is that they can encourage an agency "to neglect or defer
fundamental policy problems that it ought to have confronted and resolved." Id. at 287. Indeed, one danger is
that an agency will decide to leave unstated rules on the books and regulate through waivers.
109. See Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 MICH. L. REV. 321, 324
(1988); Timothy K. Webster, Protecting Environmental Consent Decrees from Third Party Challenges, 10
VA. ENVTL. L. 137 (1990).
110. See Pieter Winsemius, Environmental Contracts and Covenants: New Instruments for a Realistic
Environmental Policy?, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRAcfS AND COVENANTS, supra note 58, at 9-10; see also,
Brian L. Jones, Environmental Covenants and Environmental Contracts: Comments from a Common Lawyer,
in id. at 136-38.
111. See Skrzycki, supra note 40, at DI.
112. Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, supra note 35, at 27,287.
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1996 Florida APA reflected legislative sensitivity to this issue by requiring
agencies to allow "interested persons" an opportunity to comment on waiver
petitions" 3 and to file publicly available reports on the number of waivers
granted." 4 This underscoring of the need for collective discussion and debate
reflects the importance many academic commentators place on "deliberative
dialogue""' by expanding the range of participants in the regulatory
debate." 6 This does not, of course, solve the argued need for third party initi-
ated judicial review (as exemplified by the American tradition of citizens
suits"'7), but it at least assures that interested parties are aware of such agree-
ments before the fact and have the ability to make reasoned and knowledgeable
assessments of them.
C. The Problem of Accountability
Waiver provisions and other forms of cooperative activity place unique
strains on our system of administrative law. They highlight the need for ac-
countability to prevent arbitrary conduct. This accountability impulse can be
satisfied either through Congress or through the courts. It is likely that a num-
ber of accountability mechanisms will be heightened to compensate for the in-
creased flexibility that such cooperative activity represents."' These will occur
both through Congressional oversight and through the courts. Some examples of
the range of available accountability mechanisms are noted below.
1. The Role of Congress
The recognition of agency empowerment places considerable responsibility
on Congress to ensure principles of democratic accountability. After all, Con-
gress, not agencies or bureaucrats, has the responsibility for setting policy pa-
rameters for agencies. The sad reality is that Congress often fails to provide
agencies with clear and precise statutory directives. In fact, many regulatory
statutes contain numerous ambiguous or seemingly contradictory terms "as a
result of legislative compromises that are struck to secure votes for the enact-
113. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.542(d) (West Supp. 1997).
114. See id. § 120.542.
115. McGarity, supra note 6, at 1524-25.
116. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669,
1760-61 (1975).
117. Most major environmental statutes provide for citizen suits and are, therefore, part of the enforce-
ment scheme of federal environmental law. See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen
Suits, "Injuries," and Article II1, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 165 (1992). That scheme calls for various express
private rights of action against a party who has violated a statute. See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1955, Pub. L.
No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 323 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994)); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1994); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6924(o)(2) (1994). At the same time, "private
rights of action" are also implied through a pervasive regulatory scheme. See generally Susan J. Stabile, The
Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence of Implied Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 861 (1996). The withdrawal by the Congress of its enforcement monopoly is based in part on the con-
gressional belief that "the federal government cannot be fully trusted to effectively enforce controls." Stewart,
supra note 7, at 586.
118. See infra notes 122, 125-26, 130 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 32:325
20
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 32 [1996], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol32/iss2/6
19961 REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY
ment of a statute."" 9 Clearer and more precise statutory directives remain the
single most effective way that Congress can ensure control over the regulatory
landscape. Still, the literature, be it based on "public choice" theory' or plu-
ralism,' is replete with theoretical discussion of why Congress will choose
ambiguity over precision. The plain fact is that the "sin," such as it is, remains
that of Congress and not the bureaucracy.
Congress has made some efforts in recent years to promote regulatory
accountability. Most well-known is the so-called "corrections day."'2 Cor-
rections day is an effort to create an expedited procedure for correcting so-
called "mistakes" made by the regulatory apparatus."z The corrections day
concept was first introduced by Congressman Newt Gingrich and later insti-
tutionalized in a special calendar passed by the House of Representatives in
June, 1995.2"
Recently, the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of
19 96 1s established a requirement for Congressional review of agency regula-
tions. 6 This statute creates a complex procedure which requires agencies to
submit proposed rules to each house of Congress where they lay on the table
for at least sixty days for Congressional review. 7 During this time, Congress
119. ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 769 (1995).
120. See Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative
Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, 55-57 (1982) (arguing that Members of Congress delegate regulatory authority
to agencies in part in order to shift blame to agencies).
121. See Chantal Mouffe, Democracy and Pluralism: A Critique of the Rationalist Approach, 16
CARDOZO L. REV. 1533 (1995). As Mouffe points out, "for extreme pluralists, there is only a multiplicity of
identities without any common denominator." Id. at 1535. It is politics that "mediates the struggle among self-
interested groups for scarce social resources." Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REV. 29, 32 (1985). While some purists believe that the "uninhibited interest-group struggle" is no
cause for alarm, id. at 33, most accept that some issues are too fractious for a democratic polity to take on.
One of the mechanisms democratic institutions use to "reach decisions without resolving certain value con-
flicts are through [the] practice[] referred to ... as... avoidance." Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Ander-
son, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism and Democratic Politics, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2166 (1990). Ambiguously written statements allow Congress to "shift the institutional
site of resolution" to the courts thereby avoiding addressing underlying value conflicts. Id. at 2170.
122. For a full review of the possibilities and meaning of corrections day, see John Copeland Nagle,
Corrections Day, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1267 (1996). Some proposals can be found in INSTITUTE FOR POLICY
INNOVATION & THE ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE INSTITUTION, CANDIDATES FOR CORRECTION DAY: THE TEN
WORST REGULATIONS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1996).
123. See NEWT GINGRICH, To RENEWV AMERICA 225-27 (1995). It should be obvious that corrections day
results from a theory of statutory interpretation that would view Congress as the preferable place to correct
statutory error or ambiguity rather than the courts.
124. H.R. Res. 480, 104th Cong. (1995). Corrections are required to be passed by a three-fifths majority
to be effective. See David Rogers, House GOP is Dealt Blow as Bill to End Transit Workers' Protection is
Rejected, WALL ST. J., July 25, 1995, at A2. The first corrections day occurred on July 16, 1995. See Not
Much of a Correction, WASH. POST, July 27, 1995, at A18. The 104th Congress' first correction gave the city
of San Diego a permanent waiver to EPA regulations that would have required the city to spend two billion
dollars on an additional sewage treatment plant. See id. The 103rd Congress had given San Diego a temporary
waiver that was subject to mandatory review every five years. See id.
125. Pub. L. No. 104-121, §§ 201-253, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 StaL) 857-74.
126. See id. § 251, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 868 (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808). Repre-
sentative David McIntosh (R-Ind.) hailed the bill as a "revolutionary change" which will recreate the role of
Vice President Dan Quayle's Council on Competitiveness in the Congress by giving Congress the "chance to
reject those rules that are seriously flawed." See Marianne Lavelle, Why are Regulation Foes Happy?, NAT'L
L., July 29, 1996, at A14.
127. Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 251, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 868 (to be codified at 5 U.S.C.
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has .the opportunity to pass a Joint Resolution of Disapproval.' Should the
President veto the Joint Resolution, there is an expedited process for the veto
override.'29
Likewise, the Congressional Responsibility Act of 1995,130 would have
required that proposed regulations be submitted to Congress 3' and the majori-
ty leader of each house would then submit bills to enact the proposed regula-
tion.'32 The bills would be placed on a "fast track" that would make them
nonamendable and allow for only one hour of debate.'33 The "fast track"
would also require that a vote take place within 60 days.'
Where the drafting of more precise statutory directives fails, this type of
Congressional responsibility should, in principle, be encouraged. There are,
however, problems with the Congressional Responsibility Act approach. One
such problem is the bill's broad definition of what constitutes a "rule." A "rule"
is defined so as to include not only legislative rules, but also interpretive rules
and general statements of policy as well.'35 The result of so broad a definition
is that Congress would be required to vote on all manner of agency positions
whether or not they have the "force of law" with little, if any, time to make
considered judgments.
Proposals, like the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995,"' are too
inefficient to provide a workable means of cabining agency discretion. This
draconian approach would ensure that Congress is so flooded by proposed
regulations that it could not review any with serious deliberation. More impor-
tantly, these approaches reject the notion of agency delegation and will inelucta-
bly force Congress into agency micro-management. This has the potential to
make every action of an administrative agency a political act, thereby gutting
any notion of agency expertise.37 Congress would, for all practical purposes,
§ 801).
128. See id. § 251, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 871 (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 802).
129. See id. The process has been described and criticized as a delaying tactic which allows special inter-
est lobbyists a second opportunity to derail regulations they oppose. See Pantelis Michalopoulous, Holding
Back Time to Hold Back Rules, LEGAL TIMES, May 13, 1996, at 25.
130. H.R. 2727, 104th Cong. (1995). It should be noted that Justice Stephen Breyer, in the aftermath of
the legislative veto case, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), advanced a proposal not unlike those men-
tioned here. See Stephen Breyer, Reforming Regulation, 59 TUL. L. REv. 4, 11-14 (1984) (suggesting the
creation of a fast track process that would allow for automatic introduction of a bill after an agency submitted
a proposal to Congress).
131. H.R. 2727, § 3(b).
132. See id. § 4(a).
133. See id. §§ 4(c)(2)-4(c)(3).
134. See id. § 4(d).
135. See Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 211(1), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 857, 858 (adopting the definition
of "rule" in 5 U.S.C. § 601 which defines a rule as "any rule for which the agency publishes a general notice
of proposed rulemaking pursuant to § 553(b) of this title").
136. Pub. L. No. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3 (1995) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1438). A less severe itera-
tion of this principle can be found in the Significant Regulation Oversight Act of 1996, H.R. 2990, 104th
Cong. (1996), which would require significant rules to be affirmatively approved by both houses of Congress
before they become effective.
137. In his well argued book opposing delegation, David Schoenbrod, the intellectual guru of the anti-
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become a committee of the whole, running agencies as varied as the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and the Department of State. Of course, Congress does
exercise considerable control through appropriations. The Congressional target
can be broad - such as an entire department,"' or as particularized as a pro-
hibition on spending an appropriations to promulgate a particular rule.'39
2. The Role of Courts
a. Judicial Review
Agency efforts at regulatory flexibility create legal issues that are not gen-
erally covered by the APA. These issues involve the treatment of cooperative
agreements while the APA is focused on either adjudication or rulemaking.
These cooperative impulses can take a range of forms ranging from a closely
worked out settlement agreement to an informal "wink and a nod." The level of
formality will impact on the level of accountability.
One need not here propose that regulatory flexibility require a more activ-
ist judiciary. The notion of increasing regulatory flexibility by empowering
agency officials with added discretion requires, of necessity, significant judicial
deference to agency exercise of that discretion. There is no point in fostering
administrative discretion if that discretion is checked by a heightened level of
judicial review. Strict judicial review is inconsistent with agency empowerment
in that, in its "hard look" form,"4 at least, it means reduced deference to the
results of agency decision-making or, in Judge Harold Leventhal's phrase, "an
awareness that agencies and courts together constitute a 'partnership' in fur-
therance of the public interest.' 4'
One must, however, believe the need to ensure accountability for coopera-
tive agreements will require that a number of legal doctrines be fine-tuned and,
at points, revived. These include doctrines surrounding the meaning of "final
agency action" and "fair warning" of ambiguous regulatory language. 42 It
may, as well, require increased incentives for third-party intervention as a mode
of providing greater accountability over cooperative enforcement. 43
138. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law as a Mirror of the Future: Civic Values Confronting
Market Force Dynamics in a Time of Counter-Revolution, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 733, 753-54 (1996)
(detailing what he calls the "stealth attack" on environmental law by the 104th Congress in its proposed thirty
percent cut in the EPA's program budget, and fifty percent cut in the agency's enforcement budget).
139. See infra note 170 (discussing the Congressional prohibition on OSHA developing an ergonomic
rule). See also Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions for the Department of Defense to
Preserve and Enhance Military Readiness Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-6, Tit. 11, ch. IV, 109 Stat. 73, 86
(1995) (prohibiting the use of federal money to list a species as threatened or endangered, or for listing a
critical habitat).
140. Greater Boston Tel. Corp. v. F.C.C., 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
141. Id. See also Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U.
PA. L. REv. 509, 511 (1974).
142. See infra pp. 348-53.
143. See supra pp. 343-44.
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b. Selective Enforcement
One difficult question is how flexibility in enforcement strategy affects the
enforcement process. Flexibility in enforcement means, for example, that en-
forcement agents such as compliance officers in the OSHA enforcement process
have discretion in citing companies for violations (a position that has already
begun to be accepted).'" It means that EPA officials would be empowered to
tell businesses that they will overlook certain violations if the company engages
in certain compliance procedures.'45
This raises, of course, the question of the review of prosecutorial discretion
and selective prosecution. The APA provides for review of final agency action
and according to the statute, action includes the "failure to act."'" Indeed,
"legislative material elucidating that seminal act [agency action] manifests a
congressional intention that it cover a broad spectrum of administrative ac-
tions."'47
Nonetheless, under present law, decisions of government officials in de-
clining to act are not normally reviewable unless Congress specifically states
otherwise." The Court in Heckler v. Chaney makes a distinction between
agency action, which is reviewable, and inaction, 49 which is not. As Chaney
states, agency nonenforcement decisions are "general[ly] unsuitab[le] for judi-
cial review."'5° The Chaney principle has been applied to enforcement deci-
sions,' including settlement agreements.'52 Whatever the merits of Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in Chaney, it is clear that the increased use of decisions
144. OSHA inspectors were historically understood to have no discretion in issuing citations when they
saw a cause for complaint. See 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1988) (stating that the inspector, upon finding a violation,
"shall.. . issue a citation to the employer") (emphasis added); BENJAMIN W. MINTZ, OSHA: HISTORY, LAW,
AND POLICY 358, 482 (1984). Mintz notes that OSHA is "based on the principle that compliance inspec-
tions.... are followed... by citations and penalties," id. at 358, and notes that OSHA has interpreted the
"shall" language in the statute quoted as "mandatory, thus precluding on-site, sanction-free consultation by
OSHA representatives," id. at 482 n.1. Any decisions to reduce penalties or waive prosecution had to be made
by attorneys for OSHA (in the Solicitor of Labor's office). This lack of discretionary authority probably re-
flected industry's fears that OSHA inspectors possessed too much authority. Under pressure from the Republi-
can Congress, the Clinton administration has found that the OSHA inspectors do have some discretionary
authority and have started to develop waiver programs for companies in substantial compliance or who are in
a cooperating mode. See OSHA Policy on Written Program Violations Seeks "Consistent Enforcement" of
Standards, 25 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 828 (Nov. 15, 1995).
145. See supra notes 30-31.
146. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1994).
147. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967).
148. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985).
149. See id. at 831.
150. Id.
151. See Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that the
FDA's failure to initiate enforcement proceedings under the FCA Act to determine if a product was adulterat-
ed was not subject to judicial review under Chaney). As Chaney holds, however, if an agency has "'con-
sciously and expressly adopted a general policy' that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statu-
tory responsibilities," judicial review is appropriate. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4; see also International Un-
ion, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Brock, 783 F.2d 237,
245 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
152. See Schering Corp. v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 683, 685-87 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that the FDA's deci-
sion not to pursue an enforcement action when it reached a settlement agreement was not reviewable under
Chaney).
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"not to act" in a cooperative context makes that distinction even more problem-
atic.'53 If we are going to expand agency discretion to settle, or to formulate
individuated regulatory solutions, then the judiciary's ability to review decisions
"not to act" becomes significant. The D.C. Circuit has already limited the reach
of Chaney in rulemaking contexts.'54 Settlement agreements, waiver decisions
and other cooperative activity require far more complex agency internal deci-
sional activity than traditional nonenforcement decisions or decisions "not to
act." As such efforts at regulatory flexibility increase, it will become vital for
the Court to revisit the Chaney principle and limit its notion of "non-action"
which precludes judicial review.'55
One way to alleviate this difficulty would be to follow the example of the
1996 Florida revisions, which require that an agency decision on a waiver peti-
tion include a statement of facts and reasons, whether the agency does or does
not decide to grant the waiver.'56 The statement of reasons should provide a
reviewing court with "law to apply," thus ensuring some realistic possibility of
accountability through judicial review.'57
c. Fair Warning
Increased use of cooperative and individuated regulatory arrangements will,
of necessity, increase the level of ambiguity and unpredictability surrounding
legal standards. Legal doctrines regarding clarity and predictability in agency
action (or inaction) will have to be monitored closely.
Industry has long argued that regulations should be specific and detailed
and that industry should not be punished for failing to meet ambiguous stan-
dards. Although at odds with standard criminal law doctrine which teaches that
ignorance of the law is no excuse,' the opposite view has been followed in
administrative law, even where there has been a mistake of law created by
governmental error."5 9 All of these cases, however, deal with situations where
one could have discerned what the law required if one had tried rather than
relying on statements by government officials. When there is "regulatory confu-
153. The decision was sharply criticized in Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v.
Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 653 (1985).
154. See American Horse Protection Ass'n, Inc. v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987) on remand, 681
F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1988) (finding that Heckler v. Chaney did not preclude judicial review of an agency's
refusal to initiate rulemaking).
155. In this regard, I concur with Bernard Schwartz who argues that "there is no place for unreviewable
discretion in a system such as ours. Provided that the case is justiciable, all discretionary power should be
reviewable to determine that the discretion conferred has not been abused." BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW § 8.12, at 495 (3rd ed. 1991).
156. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.542(7) (West Supp. 1997).
157. For an example in the Federal context, see Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
158. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1990).
159. See Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990); Schweiker v. Hansen, 450
U.S. 785 (1981); Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
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sion," one cannot discern what the law is even if one tries."6' This, of course,
is a danger in a regulatory flexibility regime.
For their part, courts have begun to invalidate enforcement that relied on
ambiguous regulatory directives. For example, in General Electric Co. v.
EPA, 6' the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit affirmed the EPA's interpretation of regulations promulgated under the
Toxic Substance Control Act, 62 even though the court noted that GE's inter-
pretation "may also be reasonable.""'6 At the same time, the court vacated
GE's fine on the grounds that GE did not have fair notice of the EPA's inter-
pretation of the regulations thus raising constitutional due process concerns.'64
In the past, before drastic sanctions could be imposed, courts have held that
"elementary fairness compels clarity.""'6 This means that "by reviewing the
regulations and other public statements issued by the agency, a regulated party
acting in good faith would be able to identify with 'ascertainable certainty' the
standards with which the agency expects parties to conform."'"
More recently, an Occupational Safety and Health Administrative Law
Judge vacated an OSHA citation against Columbia Presbyterian Hospital for
failure to use respirators when treating TB infected patients.67 Instead of res-
pirators, Columbia's policy required the use of surgical masks.' At the time
of the alleged violation, the Center for Disease Control allowed use of surgical
masks while regional OSHA guidelines seemed to require a respirator.'69 In
the absence of a clear rule of conduct, the ALJ found that the hospital could not
have reasonably known what standard of conduct to follow and, therefore, could
not be sanctioned. 7
0
This issue is posed even more starkly in Secretary of Labor v. Pepperidge
Farms, a case now under review by the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission. '7' In Pepperidge Farms, OSHA cited the company for violations
160. See Timothy A. Wilkins, Regulatory Confusion, Ignorance of Law, and Deference to Agencies: Gen-
eral Electric Co. v. EPA, 49 SMU L. REv. 1561, 1562 (1996). Professor Wilkins defines regulatory confusion
as "situations in which the meaning or an agency's interpretations of regulations cannot be readily understood
by persons to whom those regulations apply." Id.
161. 53 F.3d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
162. The Act governs the manufacture, use and disposal of PCBs. See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (1994).
163. See General Electric, 53 F.3d at 1328. The court implied, however, that "in cases of first impression,
if an agency interpretation needs to lean on the principle of deference to successfully obtain a judicial en-
dorsement, then the interpretation is questionable enough to provide constitutionally insufficient warning to
the regulated community." Wilkins, supra note 145, at 1576.
164. See id. at 1331.
165. Radio Athens, Inc. v. FCC, 401 F.2d 398, 404 (D.C. Cir 1968).
166. General Electric, 53 F.3d at 1329. The General Electric court pointed out the danger of obscurity
problems, see jd. at 1331-32, as well as differentiation problems when different parts of an agency take dif-
ferent positions as to the meaning of a regulation, see id. at 1332, which lead the court to find that constitu-
tional due process required that the fee be invalidated, see id. at 1330.
167. See Secretary of Labor v. Columbia Presbyterian Hosp., No. 93-298, 1996 WL 18880, at *I I
(O.S.H.R.C. Jan. 2, 1996).
168. See id. at *2.
169. See id. at *3.
170. See id. at *8.
171. Secretary of Labor v. Pepperidge Farms Inc., No. 89-265, (O.S.H.R.C.) (oral argument held Sept. 20,
1996). For discussion of the case, see Mimi Veis, Pepperidge Farm Case Sparks Debate on Employer's Role
[Vol. 32:325
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of the general duty of care for various ergonomics violations including alleged
repetitive motion and back injury hazards. As the government does not yet have
an OSHA standard for ergonomics hazards,"' Campbell's Soup (the owner of
Pepperidge Farms) fought back claiming that they should not be held liable for
violating the general duty clause of the regulation when no standard of proper
conduct exists. Finding that OSHA's allegations could not be upheld because
the agency could not specifically show how the problem could be abated, the
ALJ agreed with Campbell's. Obviously an employer does not require an
OSHA regulation to guide his or her conduct in every general duty case. Some
safety measures are obvious, even to a layman, but the company, the ALJ
found, cannot be required to "experiment" between different safety options in
the absence of clear-cut abatement methods.
This view is flawed. While the ALJ could properly find on the basis of a
"fair warning" approach that a company should not be fined for choosing, like
GE, one particular abatement option over another, it would seem appropriate to
require that a company make some effort at abatement. Put otherwise, the fail-
ure to make any effort to abate ergonomic concerns may be citeable while the
failure to use any particular method (in the absence of an agreed upon standard
of care) is not.
Legislation such as the Regulatory Fair Warning Act has been proposed to
follow up on this theme.'73 This legislation would create an affirmative de-
fense against the imposition of penalties when defendants lacked adequate
in Abatement, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Sept. 23, 1996, at 184.
172. Here you cannot blame OSHA. The agency began working on a standard during the last years of the
Bush administration. See Curt Suplee, House to Consider 'Ergo Rider' Restraints on OSHA, WASH. POST,
July 11, 1996, at A4. In May, 1995, OSHA finalized a proposed ergonomic protection standard, but before the
agency could publish the proposed standard in the Federal Register, a Congressional rider forbid the agency to
continue working on the standard. See id. It did this by prohibiting OSHA from spending any appropriations
"to promulgate or issue any proposed or final standard or guidelines regarding ergonomic protection." H.R.
1158, 104th Cong., § 601 (1995). A similar rider, however, was removed from the fiscal 1997 Labor Depart-
ment Appropriations bill, thus leaving OSHA free to return to work on the standard. Agency Will Explore
Options Before Promulgating Final Standard, 26 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 190 (July 24, 1996). In De-
cember, 1996, the Clinton Administration announced that it would renew efforts to promulgate an ergonomics
standard. See Steve Lohr, Administration Renews Efforts on Prevention of Repetitive Motion Injuries, N.Y.
TImES, Dec. 11, 1996, at A24.
173. H.R. 3307, 104th Cong, 2nd Sess. (1996). This act would have limited the sanctions that courts and
administrative agencies can impose for rule violations where the alleged violator had not been given fair
warning of what conduct would result in a violation of the rule. The bill was reported in the House on Sep-
tember 28, 1996, but failed to be brought to a vote before the end of the session on October 3. 142 CONG.
REC. 12172 (Sept. 28, 1996). The Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S. 343, 104th Cong.,
would have allowed the use of a lack of fair warning as a defense to an enforcement action. 141 CONG. REC.
S9982-84 (July 14, 1995) (Hutchinson amendment).
The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1995 takes a somewhat different tack
where agencies are required to reduce civil penalties when non-compliance results from unclear regulations.
See Pub. L. No. 104-121, §§ 201-253, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 857-74. That law would require agen-
cies to develop compliance guides for new rules. See id. § 212, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 858. They
would be further required to provide "information to small business concerns regarding compliance with regu-
latory requirements." See id. § 214, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 859. Further, the agency is authorized to
reduce or waive penalties should confusion reign. See id. § 223, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) at 862. Final-
ly, the above mentioned agency material including compliance guides and responses to small business inquires
can be introduced as mitigating evidence in any agency proceeding. See id.
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warning of what constitutes appropriate and inappropriate conduct. In this re-
gard, the bill amplifies section 552(a)(2)(c) of the APA which states:
A final order, opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual
or instruction that affects a member of the public may be relied on, used,
or cited as precedent by an agency against a party other than an agency
only if
(i) it has been indexed and either made available or published as
provided by this paragraph, or
(ii) the party has actual and timely notice of the terms therein.'
Recognizing this trend, Judge Patricia Wald of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia has written that "legislators and rulemakers
would do well to proceed in the immediate future with even greater caution
than in the past in insuring that their rules give forenotice of what is expected
of the regulated and fair procedures for disputing alleged violations."2
Regulatory flexibility, however, would require a markedly different ap-
proach. As Philip Howard notes: "[S]everal hundred pages of OSHA rules
could be replaced by one sentence: 'Tools and equipment should be reasonably
suited for the use intended, in accordance with industry standards.""
176
Contrary to Howard's view, OSHA's general duty clause, section 5(a)(1),
requires just that. Section 5(a)(1) states "[e]ach employer shall furnish to each
of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from
recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious phys-
ical harm to his employees."" Recourse to these general principles only
masks the tensions that often arise between fair warning concerns and regulato-
ry flexibility. On one hand, industry often reacts with horror to the general duty
clause, finding it far to uncertain and ambiguous precisely because it eschews
detail for general principles empowering regulators to make use of their discre-
tion. At the same time, industry representatives often criticize many agency
rules as inflexible and thus support proposals such as H.R. 9 or S. 343 that
place added restrictions on the process of agency rulemaking.' 8 "Fair warn-
ing" is a valuable principle and it is one that may create a further reason for an
agency to regulate by rulemaking rather than adjudication. The notion, however,
that case-by-case adjudication violates fair warning principles is unsettling. And,
174. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(c) (1994).
175. Hon. Patricia Wald, Environmental Postcards From the Edge: The Year That Was and the Year Thai
Might Be, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10182, 10187 (1996).
176. See Regulatory Reform Interview, supra note 82, at 23. Howard continues: "To be fair, there are
some good rules - toxic hazard limits are a good example - where you need explicit limits. No general
principle is going to tell you how much benzene or cotton dust is tolerable." Id.
177. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1994). The relation between the general duty clause and the common law
duty of reasonable care is discussed in David J. Kolesar, Note, Cumulative Trauma Disorders: OSHA's Gen-
eral Duty Clause and the Need for an Ergonomics Standard, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2079, 2088 n.70 (1992).
178. Already, the additional procedures added to traditional agency rulemaking in recent years by the
Congress, the Executive and the courts have caused many agencies to retreat from rulemaking to accomplish
their regulatory goals. The most extreme example of this deformation has been the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration which effectively stopped issuing rules in the mid-1970s and began regulating through
the use of recalls (a form of case-by-case adjudication). See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, TttE
STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 10-11 (1990).
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indeed, it need not be the case as long as the flexibility exercised in a case-by-
case approach remains faithful to an agency's statutory charge. While an impor-
tant limiting condition, fair warning principles should not be used to preclude a
flexibility jurisprudence, nor should performance regulations - arguably the




While only time will tell what the specific permutations of greater regula-
tory flexibility will be, there is no doubt that this shift is more than a passing
phase. In some instances this may mean simply less command and control and
more performance regulations. In others it may mean cooperative interaction
that places enforcement at least initially on the back burner.
The challenge in all this will be two fold, first, to retain a theory of ac-
countability between legislature and bureaucracy and, second, to implement
flexibility in ways that do not forgo traditional notions of fairness and consis-
tency in the administrative process. Thus, as example, performance regulations
and waiver mechanisms should be supported to the extent that they are defined
by clear statutory standards. Waivers should not be premised on the personal
idiosyncracies or personal agendas of agency bureaucrats. The corollary of this
general rule, of course, is that to the extent that waivers or settlements such as
those in the Brownfields model lack consistent standards, they should be
viewed as inappropriate. It further means skepticism for such innovations as
hardship waivers, or environmental covenants when they are not structured by
objective standards. But this, of course, has always been the challenge of ad-
ministrative procedure in the modem administrative state.
179. Consider, as example, the following proposal for a regulatory "fix": "Notwithstanding any other pro-
vision of law, an agency shall be permitted to use economic incentives to induce industries to eliminate or
reduce risks, if it can show that these methods will produce at least equivalent benefits in a more cost-effec-
tive manner." Sunstein, supra note 7, at 298.
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